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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
John J. Bibby claimed to have been subjected to same- 
sex sexual harassment at the hands of his employer, the 
Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Company, in violation of 
Title VII. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
the employer, and Bibby appealed. Because we conclude 
that Bibby did not present sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that he suffered discrimination "because of 




John Bibby has been an employee of the Philadelphia 
Coca-Cola Bottling Company since June 1978. In 1993, 
Bibby, who is gay, experienced some medical difficulties, 
including weight loss, breathing problems, and vomiting 
blood.1 On August 12, 1993, Bibby was having pains in his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While Bibby claimed that he was perceived by his employer and his 
co-workers as having HIV/AIDS, he did not bring a claim for 
discrimination on the basis of perceived disability under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. 
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stomach and chest when he was found by his supervisor 
with his eyes closed and a machine for which he was 
responsible malfunctioning with product being destroyed. 
He was accused of sleeping on the job. Bibby asked for 
permission to go to the hospital and was told by the 
supervisor to "just go." As he was leaving, the supervisor 
told him he was terminated, although in fact he was 
suspended with the intent to terminate. Bibby was 
hospitalized for several weeks for treatment of depression 
and anxiety. During his suspension and after receiving 
clearance from his treating physician, he met with his 
supervisors to arrange his return to work. At this meeting, 
he was told that he would be paid $5,000 and would be 
given benefits and unemployment benefits for six months if 
he resigned, but if he did not accept the offer, he would be 
terminated. Bibby refused the offer and was terminated 
but, following arbitration of a grievance he filed, he was 
reinstated and awarded back pay. 
 
On December 23, 1993, the day he returned to work, 
Bibby was assaulted in a locker room by a co-worker, 
Frank Berthcsi. Berthcsi told Bibby to get out of the locker 
room, shook his fist in Bibby's face, grabbed Bibby by the 
shirt collar, and threw him up against the lockers. On 
January 22, 1995, Berthcsi again came after Bibby. 2 On 
that day, Bibby was at the top of a set of steps working at 
a machine that puts cases of soda on wooden or plastic 
pallets. Berthcsi was driving a forklift loaded with pallets, 
and he "slammed" the load of pallets under the stairs, 
blocking Bibby's exit from the platform on which he was 
standing. Bibby paged a supervisor, and Berthcsi was 
ordered to remove the pallets. He refused. Berthcsi and 
Bibby then exchanged some angry words, and Berthcsi 
repeatedly yelled at Bibby that "everybody knows you're gay 
as a three dollar bill," "everybody knows you're a faggot," 
and "everybody knows you take it up the ass." 3 Later that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In Bibby's brief to this Court, he claims that Berthcsi "regularly 
engaged in harassment of a sexual nature with violent features against 
[Bibby]." The brief offers no citation to support this claim, and the 
record 
reveals only the December 1993 and January 1995 incidents. 
 
3. We do not usually reproduce such gratuitously crude language in our 
opinions. Here, however, the essential dispute concerns whether the 
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day, Berthcsi called Bibby a "sissy." Bibby filed a complaint 
with the union and with the employer, and Berthcsi was 
suspended pending an investigation. Bibby refused the 
union's request that he withdraw the complaint, and 
Berthcsi's employment was terminated. The union filed a 
grievance on behalf of Berthcsi, and he was reinstated 
subject to the employer's condition that he undergo anger 
management training. 
 
Bibby claims that supervisors also harassed him by 
yelling at him, ignoring his reports of problems with 
machinery, and arbitrarily enforcing rules against him in 
situations where infractions by other employees would be 
ignored. He does not assert that there was any sexual 
component to any of this alleged harassment. Finally, Bibby 
claims that graffiti of a sexual nature, some bearing his 
name, was written in the bathrooms and allowed to remain 
on the walls for much longer than some other graffiti. The 
record does not disclose the contents of any graffiti that 
allegedly mentioned Bibby's name. 
 
Shortly after the January 1995 incident with Berthcsi, 
Bibby filed a complaint with the Philadelphia Human Rights 
Commission (PHRC) alleging that he was being 
discriminated against on the basis of his sexual orientation. 
In late 1997, after completing an investigation, the PHRC 
notified Bibby that it was closing the case and issuing him 
a 90-day right to sue letter. 
 
On January 20, 1998, Bibby filed a pro se complaint in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He subsequently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
language and actions of Bibby's co-workers and supervisors constituted 
actionable sexual harassment, which requires "[c]onduct that is . . . 
severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive 
work environment -- an environment that a reasonable person would 
find hostile or abusive . . . ." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc., 
523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 
U.S. 
17, 21 (1993)). To indulge in delicacy in light of what the Court 
described 
as a "crucial" requirement would obscure the issue before this Court. See 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) ("we think it is 
important both to acknowledge the appalling persecution [the plaintiff] 
allegedly endured and to identify the precise nature of the abuse so as 
to distinguish this case from future cases as they arise"). 
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retained counsel, however, and an amended complaint was 
filed on June 30, 1998. The amended complaint named as 
defendants the employer and nine individual officers or 
employees of the employer. In the amended complaint, 
Bibby alleged that he had been sexually harassed in 
violation of Title VII, and sought compensatory and punitive 
damages. The complaint also included two supplemental 
state law claims, one for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and one for assault and battery. 
 
On November 20, 1998, the District Court granted in part 
defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing all individual 
defendants and dismissing Bibby's assault and battery 
claim.4 Following a period of discovery, the employer filed a 
motion for summary judgment on the remaining counts. On 
March 2, 2000, the District Court granted this motion. In 
its twenty-page memorandum and order, the Court 
determined that the evidence indicated that Bibby was 
harassed because of his sexual orientation and not because 
of his sex. Because Title VII provides no protection from 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, summary 
judgment was granted on Bibby's Title VII claim. Having 
dismissed the only federal claim, the Court chose not to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 
law claim and dismissed that claim without prejudice. 
 
It is from the grant of summary judgment to the employer 
that Bibby appeals. Our review is plenary. See Pittston Co. 
Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 515 (3d 
Cir. 1997). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
 
This appeal presents a single issue: did Bibby present 
evidence sufficient to support a claim of same-sex sexual 
harassment under Title VII? The District Court found that 
Bibby was harassed because of his sexual orientation, not 
because of his sex, and therefore rejected his sexual 
harassment claim. Bibby argues that the District Court 
erred and further argues that its finding, if upheld, would 
place a special burden on gay and lesbian plaintiffs alleging 
same-sex sexual harassment because they will be required 
to prove that harassment was not motivated by their sexual 
orientation. We disagree on both scores. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Bibby has not appealed the dismissal of these claims. 
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Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.S 2000e 
et seq., provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment 
practice . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . 
because of . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1). It is clear, 
however, that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. Simonton v. Runyon , 232 F.3d 
33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, 
Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Williamson v. A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989). 
Congress has repeatedly rejected legislation that would 
have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation. See, 
e.g., Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 
104th Cong. (1996); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 
1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); Employment Non- 
Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994). 
Thus, Bibby can seek relief under Title VII only for 
discrimination because of sex. 
 
Until 1998, it was unclear whether and under what 
circumstances Title VII would apply in a case of sexual 
harassment where both the harasser and the victim were of 
the same sex. The Fifth Circuit held that Title VII absolutely 
precluded a cause of action where both the harasser and 
victim were male. Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 
F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fourth Circuit, 
however, found a cause of action for same-sex sexual 
harassment under Title VII but only if the harasser was 
homosexual. Compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board 
of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) ("a claim 
does not lie where both the alleged harassers and the 
victim are heterosexuals of the same sex"), with Wrightson 
v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 
1996) ("a same-sex `hostile work environment' sexual 
harassment claim may lie under Title VII where a 
homosexual male (or female) employer discriminates 
against an employee of the same sex"). Finally, the Seventh 
Circuit suggested that same-sex harassment was always 
actionable as long as the harassment was sexual in nature, 
regardless of the sex, sexual orientation, or motivation of 
the harasser and regardless of the sex of the victim. Doe v. 
City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir. 1997) (proof 
of a desire to discriminate against one gender is not 
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necessary "when the harassment has explicit sexual 
overtones"). 
 
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. , 523 U.S. 
75 (1998), the Supreme Court unanimously held that Title 
VII does provide a cause of action for same-sex sexual 
harassment. Id., 523 U.S. at 79. In Oncale, the Court 
reviewed a Fifth Circuit decision which held that, as a 
matter of law, Title VII categorically barred any claim for 
same-sex sexual harassment. Id. at 77. The Court reversed. 
Title VII, it observed, protects men as well as women and 
just as there can be no absolute presumption that a person 
of one race would not discriminate against another person 
of the same race, there can be no absolute presumption 
that a person of one gender would not discriminate against 
another person of the same gender. Id. at 78. The Court 
reasoned that it is not the sex of the harasser or the victim 
that is important to a sexual harassment claim, but, rather, 
what is important is that the victim "prove that the conduct 
at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual 
connotations, but actually constituted `discriminat[ion] . . . 
because of . . . sex.' " Id. at 81 (emphasis, ellipses, and 
brackets in original). 
 
The question of how to prove that same-sex harassment 
is because of sex is not an easy one to answer. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Oncale, when the harasser and 
victim are of the opposite sex, there is a reasonable 
inference that the harasser is acting because of the victim's 
sex. Id. at 80. Thus, when a heterosexual man makes 
implicit or explicit proposals of sexual activity to a woman 
co-worker or subordinate, it is easy to conclude or at least 
infer that the behavior is motivated by her sex. Similarly, if 
a man is aggressively rude to a woman, disparaging her or 
sabotaging her work, it is possible to infer that he is acting 
out of a general hostility to the presence of women in the 
workplace. These inferences are not always so clear when 
the harasser and victim are of the same sex. 
 
There are several situations in which same-sex 
harassment can be seen as discrimination because of sex. 
The first is where there is evidence that the harasser 
sexually desires the victim. Id. at 80. Thus, when a gay or 
lesbian supervisor treats a same-sex subordinate in a way 
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that is sexually charged, it is reasonable to infer that the 
harasser acts as he or she does because of the victim's sex. 
 
Same-sex harassment might also be found where there is 
no sexual attraction but where the harasser displays 
hostility to the presence of a particular sex in the 
workplace. Id. (stating that same-sex sexual harassment 
could be found "if a female victim is harassed in such sex- 
specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to 
make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general 
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace"). For 
example, a woman chief executive officer of an airline might 
believe that women should not be pilots and might treat 
women pilots with hostility amounting to harassment. 
Similarly, a male doctor might believe that men should not 
be employed as nurses, leading him to make harassing 
statements to a male nurse with whom he works. In each 
of these hypothetical situations, it would be easy to 
conclude that the harassment was caused by a general 
hostility to the presence of one sex in the workplace or in 
a particular work function, and, therefore, amounted to 
discrimination because of sex. 
 
Further, although it is less clear, a plaintiff may be able 
to prove that same-sex harassment was discrimination 
because of sex by presenting evidence that the harasser's 
conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not 
conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender. Simonton, 
232 F.3d at 37-38 (discussing this theory but declining to 
rule on it because the plaintiff had not raised it before the 
District Court); Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259-60 (also declining 
to rule on this theory because it had been waived by the 
plaintiff); City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580-83 (holding that 
where co-workers verbally and physically harassed a young 
man because he wore an earring, repeatedly asked him 
whether he was a girl or a boy, and threatened to assault 
him sexually, he had presented sufficient evidence to 
support a conclusion that the harassment amounted to 
discrimination because of sex).5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The judgment in City of Belleville was vacated and the case remanded 
by the Supreme Court "for further consideration in light of Oncale. . . ." 
523 U.S. 1001. It would seem, however, that the gender stereotypes 
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The gender stereotypes method for proving same-sex 
sexual harassment is based on Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), a case in which the Supreme 
Court reviewed the sex discrimination claim of a woman 
who had been denied partnership in an accounting firm at 
least in part on the basis that she was "macho," 
"overcompensated for being a woman," needed"a course in 
charm school," was "masculine," and was"a lady using foul 
language." Id. at 235. A partner advised the plaintiff that if 
she wished to improve her chances of earning partnership, 
she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, 
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry." Id. A plurality of the Court agreed that 
"[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer 
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be 
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis 
of gender." Id. at 250. The Court noted that "we are beyond 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
holding of City of Belleville was not disturbed. In deciding the case, the 
Seventh Circuit relied on alternative holdings. The first was that where 
the harassment was sexual in nature, it was not necessary for the 
plaintiff to prove that it was motivated by the victim's gender. City of 
Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580. The second was that if proof of sex 
discrimination was necessary, the evidence that the victim's harassers 
sought to punish him for failing to live up to expected gender stereotypes 
would be sufficient to prove such discrimination. Id. at 580-83. The first 
holding was clearly wrong in light of Oncale's requirement that all sexual 
harassment plaintiffs must prove that the harassment was 
discrimination because of sex. There is nothing in Oncale, however, that 
would call into question the second holding. As we discuss above, the 
gender stereotypes argument is squarely based on Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Absent an explicit statement from the 
Supreme Court that it is turning its back on Price Waterhouse, there is 
no reason to believe that the remand in City of Belleville was intended to 
call its gender stereotypes holding into question. City of Belleville 
settled 
before there was a decision on remand, so it is not possible to know if 
the Seventh Circuit would have continued to apply the gender 
stereotypes holding. District courts in that Circuit, however, have 
continued to treat that holding as binding on them. See, e.g., Jones v. 
Pacific Rail Services, No. 00 C 5776, 2001 WL 127645, *2 (N.D. Ill. 
February 14, 2001); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co. , No. 98 C 0452, 1999 
WL 754568, *6 (N.D. Ill. September 9, 1999); EEOC v. Trugreen Limited 
Partnership, 122 F.Supp.2d 986, 989-90 (W.D.Wis. 1999). 
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the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype 
associated with their group, for `[i]n forbidding employers to 
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.' " Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water 
and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) 
(some internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of the two 
concurring opinions in Price Waterhouse disagreed. 
 
Relying on Price Waterhouse, and as we noted above, the 
Seventh Circuit held that where evidence indicated that the 
harassment of a sixteen-year old young man was motivated 
by his co-workers' belief that because he wore an earring he 
was not sufficiently masculine, there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that the harassment 
amounted to discrimination because of sex. City of 
Belleville, 119 F.3d at 581 ("a man who is harassed because 
his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair is long, or 
because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity 
in a way that does not meet his coworkers' idea of how men 
are to appear and behave, is harassed `because of ' his 
sex"). 
 
Thus, there are at least three ways by which a plaintiff 
alleging same-sex sexual harassment might demonstrate 
that the harassment amounted to discrimination because of 
sex -- the harasser was motivated by sexual desire, the 
harasser was expressing a general hostility to the presence 
of one sex in the workplace, or the harasser was acting to 
punish the victim's noncompliance with gender stereotypes. 
Based on the facts of a particular case and the creativity of 
the parties, other ways in which to prove that harassment 
occurred because of sex may be available. See Oncale, 523 
U.S. at 80-81 (noting that "[a] same-sex harassment 
plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative 
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members 
of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace"); Shepherd v. Slater 
Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) ("we 
discern nothing in the Supreme Court's [Oncale] decision 
indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be 
exhaustive rather than instructive"). 
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That having been said, however, it is clear that 
"[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, 
he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was 
not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but 
actually constituted `discrimina[tion]  . . . because of . . . 
sex.' " Oncale at 81 (emphasis, ellipses, and brackets in 
original). Bibby simply failed in this respect; indeed, he did 
not even argue that he was being harassed because he was 
a man and offered nothing that would support such a 
conclusion. There was no allegation that his alleged 
harassers were motivated by sexual desire, or that they 
possessed any hostility to the presence of men in the 
workplace or in Bibby's particular job. Moreover, he did not 
claim that he was harassed because he failed to comply 
with societal stereotypes of how men ought to appear or 
behave or that as a man he was treated differently than 
female co-workers. His claim was, pure and simple, that he 
was discriminated against because of his sexual 
orientation. No reasonable finder of fact could reach the 
conclusion that he was discriminated against because he 
was a man.6 
 
As noted earlier, Bibby argues that in reaching this 
conclusion, we will be placing an extra burden on gay and 
lesbian plaintiffs bringing an action for same-sex sexual 
harassment by requiring that such plaintiffs prove that 
their harassers were not motivated by anti-gay animus. 
Bibby is wrong. Whatever the sexual orientation of a 
plaintiff bringing a same-sex sexual harassment claim, that 
plaintiff is required to demonstrate that the harassment 
was directed at him or her because of his or her sex. Once 
such a showing has been made, the sexual orientation of 
the plaintiff is irrelevant. In addition, once it has been 
shown that the harassment was motivated by the victim's 
sex, it is no defense that the harassment may have also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Given this conclusion, we need not reach the additional requirement 
that the alleged conduct was "severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work environment . . . ." Oncale, 523 U.S. 
at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted). We note, however, that the only 
specifics Bibby has alleged are one physical assault (with no sexual 
component) and one incident of serious name calling (with a sexual 
component). 
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been partially motivated by anti-gay or anti-lesbian animus. 
For example, had the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse been a 
lesbian, that fact would have provided the employer with no 
excuse for its decision to discriminate against her because 
she failed to conform to traditional feminine stereotypes. 
 
Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no 
place in our society. See Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35 
(harassment on the basis of sexual orientation "is morally 
reprehensible whenever and in whatever context it occurs, 
particularly in the modern workplace"); Higgins, 194 F.3d 
at 259 (harassment because of sexual orientation"is a 
noxious practice, deserving of censure and opprobrium"). 
See also Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 
1209 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Higgins). Congress has not 
yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such 
harassment. Because the evidence produced by Bibby-- 
and, indeed, his very claim -- indicated only that he was 
being harassed on the basis of his sexual orientation, 
rather than because of his sex, the District Court properly 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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